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The Perils of Rural Land Use Planning: the Case of Canada
Michael . Krauss*
INTRODUCTION
ANYONE who has travelled the roads of North America (or in Can-
ada, where over fifty percent of the land mass is still inaccessible by
road, anyone who has flown via bush plane) knows that the vast majority
of the continent remains undeveloped and, in the northern part of the
continent, even uninhabited. The North American land mass could
clearly support populations well in excess of the 275 million1 who pres-
ently live there, as evidenced by the tremendous amount of food that
North America exports to foreign lands. Shipping costs would be re-
duced if foreign consumers came here to live.
William Fischel has observed that if every family in the contiguous
forty-eight United States occupied one acre of land,2 only three percent
of the U.S. land mass would be occupied by humans.3 In Canada, with
ninety percent less population and ten percent more land area than in the
United States, the comparable figure is one quarter of one percent.4 This
statistic is perhaps less meaningful than its American counterpart be-
cause of the uninhabitability of the northern third of Canada. However,
even excluding this huge land mass, only three quarters of one percent of
Canada's territory would be occupied under a one-acre-per-family rule.
Accordingly, the majority of land in North America is rural and is
destined to stay that way. The chosen urban destinations of immigrants
to Canada and the United States, as well as the continuous decline in
rural population, illustrate a preference for living in urban areas. For
* Professor of Law, George Mason University, Arlington Virginia; member of the Quebec and
American Bar Associations. This paper was originally delivered at a Donner Foundation conference
on comparative approaches to environmental preservation, sponsored by the Foundation for Re-
search in the Economics of the Environment (F.R.E.E.) in Bozeman, Montana. Thanks are due to
the Sara Scaife Foundation as well as to the above-named groups for their support. Mark Galbraith
provided valuable research assistance.
I Excluding Mexico.
2 This demographic change would be considerably more scattered than present-day suburban
sprawl, even considering non-residential uses such as shopping centers and other commercial uses,
and would be much less dense than present urban living conditions.
3 Fishel, Urban Development and Agricultural Land Markets, in THE VANISHING FARMLAND
CRISIS 79 (J. Baden, ed. 1984).
4 .03 * .1/1.1 = .25 * .01.
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most citizens, the advantages of life in a relatively congested setting out-
weigh the costs of city and suburban life. As Jane Jacobs has insightfully
revealed,' cities and suburbs have produced the wealth responsible for
our increased health, safety and prosperity.
As North America has urbanized, cities have grown and have en-
croached on contiguous, formerly rural, land. Inner rural land, because
of its proximity to the growing city market, was much more likely to be
actively used for agricultural purposes than more distant rural land.
The economic consequences of city expansion on the optimal use of
rural land are, intuitively, quite clear. However, these consequences
merit a brief review. On one hand, expansion of the consumer market for
produce raises the value of farm land.7 On the other hand, the continu-
ing approach to cities raises the attractiveness of rural land as a residen-
tial area (previously only desirable for those who wished to live far from
cities) to people who want to be near cities. Such people compete for
land use with those seeking to raise crops or livestock.
Sometimes the optimal land use will become, over time, residential
so the land will be sold and subdivided; however the typically desired
farm is larger than the typically desired back yard. Quite often farming
(which will have become more valued because of the proximity of larger
markets) will remain the most valuable land use, depending upon the
agricultural potential of the land. If market prices reflect only develop-
ment possibilities and not agricultural potential, urban expansion may
continue unchecked.
Both civil and common law courts have recognized that optimal
land use can change over time. In the law of nuisance, where courts have
generally refused to sanction the "coming-to-the-nuisance" defense8, pol-
luters' claiming the right to unduly damage neighboring land by virtue of
temporal priority have typically been unsuccessful. 9 On the other hand,
a resident's move to an industrial or agricultural zone does not necessar-
ily give him the right to halt noisy or malodorous activity. 10 Courts are
clearly hesitant to find the complained-of activity unreasonable in the
5 J. JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1985).
6 A. WILDAVASKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988).
7 From a strictly agricultural perspective, the value of the land is the present value of the future
stream of agricultural earnings. As demand for agricultural goods rises, price and the present value
of the future income stream will also rise.
8 See Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance", 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (1980).
9 See, e.g., Drysdale v. Dugas, (1896) 26 S.C.R. 20, 25 (Quebec civil law case in which stable
surrounded by expanding city judged to be a nuisance even though the stable was there first); Spur
Industries, Inc. v. Del Webb Development Corp., 108 Axiz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (encroaching
suburban development transforms agricultural use of land into a nuisance).
10 Roy c. St. Lawrence Warehouse (1973) C.A. code case: Quebec civil Purchaser of loft in
industrial area complains of industrial activity: one cannot ask that activities cease, if he knows of
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absence of evidence that "normal activities" in the neighborhood have
changed. Of course, parties remain free to purchase servitudes over
neighboring land (requiring it to receive smoke or odors, or conversely
prohibiting it from emitting smoke or odors)."1 The purchase of such a
limited property right indicates that value maximization has been at-
tained. If servitudes have not been purchased, courts will endeavor to
determine what constitutes reasonable, wealth-maximizing behavior.
To recapitulate, in North America rural land is the rule, and urban
land the exception. Yet most people prefer to live in an urban environ-
ment. This leads to the expansion of cities and, at the margin, to the
urbanization of those very narrow fringes of rural land that are undergo-
ing transformation.
If the price mechanism is allowed to function, it transmits signals
that induce economic factors to transform land use only where appropri-
ate. Misunderstanding the decentralized information processing of the
price system leads many erstwhile land use planners to advocate direct
coercive implementation of the limited and imperfect scientific knowl-
edge they possess. 1
2
In contrast to the fluid scenario sketched above are views, both in
Canada and in the United States13, that rural land must be protected
from urban encroachment by non-market, political mechanisms. Begin-
ning with Maryland in 1956, all fifty American states have enacted some
agricultural and/or open space provisions.14 As will be explained in
futher detail, Canadian protection of agricultural land is significantly
more intensive than its American counterpart.
Advocates of land use decision politicization see various "market
failures" as a justification for a more "scientific," planned, centralized
and less spontaneous approach to this question. The voluminous "mar-
ket failure" literature indicates the following imperfections.
First, market failure advocates argue that the "best" agricultural
land happens to be located very close to cities. Thus, even if quantita-
tively little farmland is urbanized, the harm to agriculture is qualitatively
significant. This is especially true because transformation is asymmetric.
the industrial nature of the area upon moving in. Presumably, if enough loft-dwellers moved in so
that the industrial use became secondary, a solution like that of Drysdale would be reached.
II See generally, Krauss and Valcke, Conceptions of Property: The Numerous Clauses of Prop-
erty Rights at Civil and Common Law (forthcoming unpublished manuscript); see also B. SIEGAN,
LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
12 See Pasour, Lessons from the Economic Calculation Debate, in THE VANISHING FARMLAND
CRISIS 99 (J. Baden, ed. 1984).
13 See, eg., Bryant & Russwurm, The Impact of Non-Farm Development on Agriculture, 19
PLAN CANADA 122 (1979) (an example of the argument made in Canada); See, e.g. NAT'L AGRIC.
LANDS STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1981) (an example of the argument made in the United States).
14 Note, Farmland and Open Space Preservation in Michigan: an Empirical Analysis, 19 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 1107, 1107 (1986)[hereinafter Farmland and Open Space Preservation].
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Land can be easily transformed from farmland to residential use, s but
the reverse transformation is expensive.
This argument is suspect. The reasons for prime agricultural land
tending to be located near cities are complex, and pose something of a
chicken-egg problem.1 6 It may well be, as indicated above, that if cities
happened to be located elsewhere, prime farmland would "relocate" as
well. The productivity of farmland depends not only upon local land and
weather conditions, but also and increasingly, on relatively mobile capi-
tal investments. 17
Even if the amount of "good" agricultural land was somehow fixed,
market failure would not be inevitable. Economic theory indicates that
private ownership of depletable resources results in socially optimal
use."'8 This use rate is governed by the relationship between the price of
the resource (agricultural land) and the interest rate. At socially optimal
exploitation levels, the price growth rate equals the interest rate. If ur-
ban land prices increase faster than interest rates, rural landowners, at
the margin, should sell less. This raises prices in the current year, and
lowers them in the future, until the margin between the prices becomes
equal to the interest rate.
A second market failure argument suggests that and market transac-
tions resulting in the transformation of rural land often fail to account
for external costs. For example, current city and suburban dwellers be-
come upset when new dwellers arrive and occupy adjoining space that
was once open and enjoyable to view. This disutility to neighboring ur-
ban dwellers is presumably an externality not captured in the negotia-
tions between farmer and developer, and is possibly greater than the
surplus derived from the contracting parties combined. Neighboring
urbanites may be prepared to pay the farmer not to sell his land, but a
large number of problems provoke holdouts, creating "transaction costs"
precluding a potentially wealth-enhancing deal. This market failure sup-
posedly justifies state intervention achieving the optimal goal of protect-
ing the agricultural land.
This argument does not address negative externality but, from a ju-
risprudential standpoint, should be viewed as the disappearance of a posi-
15 Indeed, farmland, because it is cleared, has a comparative advantage over forest land for
residential development.
16 An unresolved question is whether cities located near prime agricultural land, or whether
the best farms and the most talented farmers locate near city markets?
17 E.g. fertilizer, machinery and hired labor. Indeed, as transportation and processing have
become more efficient, proximity to markets has become less of a determinant factor for farm loca-
tion. Consequently, one would expect that some farms having located near cities when transport
systems were primitive could profitably relocate further out, for example, on presently forested areas.
18 See Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137 (1931). Many
other articles over the years have applied Hotelling's crucial insight.
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ive externality. City dwellers, having benefitted from the privacy and
scenic views provided by nearby farms, become deprived of a benefit, not
a property right, to which they had become accustomed. City dwellers
now protest, demanding that the state provide them with such a right at
a cost borne by all. Therefore, the costs are partially externalized to
others. This argument for politicization of the land use process actually
advocates the externalization of private costs, while purporting to rectify
them.
In conclusion, the existence of a positive externality (the neighbor-
ing farmland for urban dwellers) does not mean that insufficient open
spaces will be provided. If open spaces are an urban public good, the city
government is a most convenient mechanism to circumvent free-rider
problems by paying for a park, or buying a farm, with tax dollars. 19
Finally, a problem referred to as either impermanence, abandon-
ment, or (in French literature) "destructuration," that is often discussed
by market failure advocates, ultimately relates to farmer rationality.2"
The starting point for this argument is the observation that, almost by
definition, more land has a potential for development than will ultimately
be developed. If a farmer near an urban center feels his land may be
developed, he might not make capital improvements or perform required
soil and building maintenance necessary to maintain the farm as a going
concern. However, if the anticipated development fails to materialize, he
will find himself still wishing to sell his land (now at a much lower price,
to attract those who had previously passed over the property), because
through underinvestment, his land has become less valuable for farming.
Thus, from an economic point of view, too much land will be prema-
turely pulled out of agriprodution.
This market failure argument also appears to be flawed. One hopes
that farmers will not foolishly invest in buildings that developers do not
want, as such investment would be socially wasteful. Some farmers may
optimistically feel that their land is next on the list for development.
Farmers (like all investors) will not always correctly anticipate future
demand, and their errors will not always lie systematically on the side of
disinvestment (as opposed to over-investment). According to relevant
theories, the impermanence syndrome is sometimes empirically borne
out, and sometimes not.21 Finally, even if uncertainty systematically
causes underinvestment, it is not clear that impairment of a farmer's
property rights is an appropriate solution to the problem. Life is full of
19 Governmental purchases of land for park use is, while perhaps problematic, a topic distinct
from the one examined in this article.
20 See eg., Wolfe & Sack, Land Abandonment in the Rural-Urban Fringe: The Case of
Laprairie County, 4 URn. F. 12 (1978). Berry, Idling of Farmland in the Philadelphia Region, 1930-
1970, 88 REGIONAL Sc. REs. INsr. 1 (1976) (discussion paper).
21 Fischel, supra note 2, at 90.
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uncertainty, yet substitution of certainly bad events by government fiat is
not preferable. According to one author, "[m]aking certain that each of
us will die on our fiftieth birthday would allow us to optimize our life-
time paths of consumption, but it is not a very good way to increase well-
being."22
PROGRAMS TO PROTECT RuRAL LAND IN THE UNITED STATES
Despite the dubious theoretical grounds for doing so, state and fed-
eral farmland preservation programs abound.
State Programs
In the United States,23 state programs can be placed in several
categories.
Preferential Assessment Programs
Forty-five states classify real property and give different tax treat-
ment to each class. Under the typical Preferential Assessment Program
(PAP), land used for agriculture will be assessed for property tax pur-
poses according to its agricultural value, even if it is actually more valua-
ble for residential or industrial development. In other words,
notwithstanding a realtor's maxim,24 location is irrelevant in the assess-
ment of agricultural land. This provides marginal incentive to keep land
in its current agricultural use.2 5
Twenty-five of the above forty-five states add an additional disincen-
tive to their PAP, compelling the owner of newly developed land to "re-
fund" the amount of taxes "saved" over a given number of years before
the development, due to the preferential agricultural treatment. Obvi-
ously, this makes agricultural land less valuable to a developer and dis-
courages some efficient developments.
Four states, on the other hand, impose such penalties "voluntarily."
A farmer will receive preferential tax treatment only if he agrees not to
develop his land for a given number of years.26 This is the functional
equivalent of the purchase of a servitude. To the extent that property tax
is legitimate, such voluntary restrictive agreements may not pose
22 Id. at 91.
23 The author's main purpose is to describe Canadian initiatives, therefore, this article is delib-
erately brief in its sketch of the American situation.
24 E.g. that value depends only on three things: "location, location and location."
25 More precisely, it removes the clear signal sent by an increase in property taxes based on
market value. This type of tax is a signal that transforms the opportunity cost of agriculture Le., the
benefit lost by not selling to a developer, into a more tangible expenditure.
26 See Farmland and Open Space Preservation, supra note 3, at 1107.
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problems of justice,27 although they may have perverse allocative effects
as described above.
Circuit Breakers
Michigan and Wisconsin offer, through refunds issued by the state,
complete relief from all municipal or county property taxes exceeding a
percentage of the landowner's income if the landowner maintains the ru-
ral character of the land. These programs disproportionately assist poor,
usually less efficient, farmers more than efficient, usually wealthy ones,
and thus seem particularly inappropriate for agricultural enhancement.
Unlike PAPs, circuit breakers allocate the cost of such incentives to the
whole state. Under PAPs, the local taxing district internalizes the ex-
pense of the program accutely, in contrast to the circuit breaker's rela-
tively diluted direct price. From the standpoint of Public Choice
theory,28 this is distinctly disadvantageous. The more acutely taxpayers
feel that they are paying for a rent-seeking program, the more likely they
are to protest. The greater the dilution, the lesser the incentive to
protest.
Zoning and Districting
Although hundreds of municipalities have "agricultural zones,' '29
only Hawaii and Oregon have statewide rural zoning. In a sense, the
Hawaiian law30 is a dead letter, as Hawaii's Land Use Commission has
little power to prevent the subdivision that has rapidly occurred as non-
agricultural uses have increased in value.31 A recent Oregon statute32 is
more comprehensive, and seems to prevent efficient development in rural
areas. Provisions permitting urban growth in low-productivity areas
temper the law's negative effects, as well as permit non-commercial
27 There is a "your money or your life" sense to these agreements that makes their "voluntary"
nature somewhat suspect, and in any case significantly different from the purchase of servitudes. See
R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
28 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
29 See Nelson, Agricultural Zoning: A Private Alternative, in THE VANISHING FARMLAND
CRISS 113 (J. Baden, ed. 1984).
30 Land Use Commission Act, HAw. REv. STAT. § 205 (1985).
31 Under the Hawaiian statute, landowners may have their agricultural land, of a least one
acre, assessed at its use value (as opposed to its market value) if they agree not to develop for ten
years. They may have it assessed at fifty percent of its use value if they agree not to develop for
twenty years. This is equivalent to the purchase of a temporary easement.
32 Agricultural Land Use Act, OR. REv. STAT. § 215.203 (1983) (permits the establishment of
exclusive farm zones).
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building in farming zones.3 3 Several states34 have farming districts initi-
ated by the farmers themselves. Categorization of an area as a farming
district results in limits on use and also in limited tax assessment. In this
sense, the districting program resembles the voluntary restrictive agree-
ments outlined above, with the additional feature, as a collective action,
of tending to eliminate holdout problems 35 when public goods are in-
volved. It is also more likely to result in oppression when the good is
private, and a majority desires to expropriate a property right from a
dissenter.36 Presumably, a farmer's acquiescence to redistricting is more
likely if he feels that impending development is improbable. It is not
clear that non-farmers benefit from redistricting, making it look suspi-
ciously like a subsidy from urbanites.
Public Acquisition of Development Rights
Twenty-three states have programs permitting the state government
to purchase development rights from landowners, or authorizing local
governments to do so. To such an extent 37 that state action accurately
reflects a near-unanimous desire to keep land open-as opposed to a pri-
vate desire to receive amenities at no direct personal cost, but a great cost
to taxpayers generally. This type of purchase of a servitude can be effi-
cient and equitable. However, money is often in short supply for these
programs. Some jurisdictions have created Transferable Development
Rights (TDRs).38 Under this system, zoning restrictions are imposed on
rural landowners without cash compensation. The latter are however
given TDRs, for example at the rate of one TDR per five acres of land
affected by the new zoning. Rural landowners may sell TDRs to urban
developers, who may then use them according to a prescribed formula
39
to build in the urban zone at a greater density than allowed by urban
33 See Duncan, Agriculture as a Resource" Statewide Land use Programs for the Preservation of
Farmland, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 466-67 (1987).
34 The New York program is the most well-known. N.Y. AGRIC. & M. LAW, § 300-07 (Mc-
Kinney 1972 & Supp. 1990). This act empowers any owner or owners of at least five hundred acres
of land to submit a proposal to the county legislature for the creation of an agricultural district. The
creation of such a district entails low agricultural property tax assessments for any owner of at least
ten acres of land who produced at least $10,000 in agricultural products in the preceding year.
35 If unanimous assent were required for the change, some farmers would probably "hold up"
others by requiring a transfer payment before agreeing, even if they actually preferred the deal, in
order to extract more of the joint surplus for themselves.
36 Obviously, whether the move in a given case represents a private or a public good for farm-
ers is impossible to know in advance.
37 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
38 Montgomery County, Maryland is one of the nation's heading T.D.R. proponents.
39 For example, one TDR would allow building a home on a quarter acre, instead of the half
acre required in the zoning regulation. A sixty home development on a fifteen acre former farm in
the one half acre urban zone can be constructed, without any zoning change, if fifteen TDRs were
purchased on the open market.
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zoning." Thus developers appear to pay farmers for the privilege of
leaving their land open to benefit all the urbanites. These urbanites will
in turn buy their homes from the developers, who will obviously inte-
grate the cost of TDRs into the price. Although it may seem like resi-
dents are getting something for nothing, such is not the case. The
previous urban zoning41 may have been appropriate, in which case over-
density is imposed on current hapless residents of the "receiving area."
Alternatively, these receiving areas were inappropriately upzoned,42 in
which case their owners bear the impact of the TDR law, and must pay
for the entire county's public enjoyment of the open space. The constitu-
tionality of such TDR legislation is questionable.43
Right-to-Farm Statutes
All fifty states have adopted a version of a right-to-farm statute
which, to some extent, validates the "coming to the nuisance" defense"
by preventing courts from declaring farming activity a nuisance.45 For
reasons set forth above, such statutes are inefficient because they contrib-
ute to freezing existing land uses that are obsolete.'
Federal Programs
The federal role in agricultural land preservation is incoherent and
inconclusive. Until the mid-1970s, the Department of Agriculture tried
to take farmland out of production, undoubtedly to counteract perverse
incentives to overproduce created by its bwn farm subsidies. Since 1979,
following the National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS)47, the Depart-
ment has publicly espoused an opposite goal-increasing available farm
40 See Marcus, Transferable Development Rights" A Current Appraisal, 1 PROB. & PROP. 40,41
(1987); Giordano, Overstuffing the Envelope: The Problems with Creative Transfer of Development
Rights, 16 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 43 (1988); Strugar, Transferable Development Rights: Robbing Peter
to Pay Paul?, 62 U. DEW. L. REv. 633 (1985).
41 One half acre, in our example.
42 One quarter acre was the optimal lot size, and one half acre was stipulated in the regulation
solely to stimulate the purchase of TDRs.
43 Is this not a "taking" of the urbanite developer's land, just as it would have been an uncom-
pensated "downzoning" of the farmer's rural land? Compensating the farmer, but not the developer,
seems a clear denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution, as well as a possible violation of the Fifth Amendment. See IL EPSTEiN, TAKINGs 95 (1988);
Marcus, supra note 40, at 42; Fischel, Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 1581 (1988)(symposium introduction).
44 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
45 See Burgess-Jackson, The Ethics and Economics of Right-to-Farm Statutes, 9 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 481, 520-23 (1986) (listing state right-to-farm statutes).
46 Contra, Kwong & Baden, Comment The Ethics and Economics of Right to Farm Statutes, 9
HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Vy 524 (1986).
47 See NAT'L AGRIC. LANDs STUDY, supra note 12
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land. This policy has been implemented in the following ways:48
(i) environmental statements prepared by the federal government
must now emphasize the impact of federal projects on prime agricul-
tural land;
(ii) a "Farmland Protection Policy," for which final regulations were
issued in 1984, requires federal agencies to consider farmland conver-
sion impacts, but mandates no changes if there is an impact; and
(iii) a 1985 bill allows state governors to bring action in federal
courts in particular instances to enforce farmland protection laws.
Predictably, in 1982, the President's Commission on Housing asked
for a repeal of the Farmland Protection Policy on the grounds that farm-
land protection has had a detrimental impact on the cost and subsequent
availability of housing.
PROGRAMS TO PROTECT RURAL LAND IN CANADA
Notwithstanding Canadian complaints against U.S. agricultural
protectionism during negotiations leading to the historic Free Trade
Agreement 9, federal and provincial distortions of free markets in Cana-
dian agriculture and agricultural land are so numerous that only the
most consequential will be described in this article.5° Canadian constitu-
tional law is ambiguous with respect to jurisdiction over agriculture,5" so
that inter-jurisdictional duplication can be expected. All jurisdictions ap-
parently share the conviction that rural land requires scientific, state-
mandated control and protection.
Only Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia have any degree of ad-
vanced urbanization, and these three provinces have expressed a belief
48 See Schnidman, The Evolving Federal Role in Agricultural Land Preservation, 18 URB. LAW.
423 (1986).
49 See Krauss, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Now or Never, CATO INST. POL'Y
ANALYSIS (1988)[hereinafter CATO INST.].
50 Thus, for example, federal laws applying to agriculture in only one part of Canada will not
be discussed in this article. See, eg., Prairie Farm Assistance Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. P-16
(1970); see also, Candian Wheat Board Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. C-12 (1970); see also, Two Price
Wheat Act, ch. 54, 1974-1976, CAN. STAT. 1189; see also, Temporary Wheat Reserves Act of 1956,
CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 31 (2d Supp.)(1970); see also, Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act, CAN. Rv.
STAT. ch. P-17 (1970).
Because Quebec's legislation is so much more severe than that of other provinces, and because it
is more unknown due to language problems, that province's legislation will be the main focus of this
article.
51 See Constitution Act, 1867, Art. 95, CAN RaV. STAT. App. II, no. 5 (1970). This statute
gives joint competence over agriculture to Federal and Provincial legislatures. Case law has deter-
mined that Parliament has jurisdiction over agricultural issues relevant to interprovincial trade while
the provinces have exclusive competence over lands and property. See, eg., P. HOGG, CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW OF CANADA 267-75, 295-99 (Carswell Co. ed. 1977). These rubrics are interrelated,
but legislating the protection of rural land essentially falls to the provinces.
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that an agricultural crisis is imminent . 2 British Columbia was the first
province to intervene directly, when its socialist 3 government adopted
the Environment and Land Use Act in 1971.11 A 1973 Executive Order
in Council, authorized by the Act, prohibited any subdivision of "land
suitable for agriculture." A definition of "farm land" followed,55 and by
1973 a definitive Land Commission Act 6 authorized the Cabinet to des-
ignate distinct "agricultural land reserves." All non-agricultural activity,
including subdivision and removal of topsoil, on these reserves is forbid-
den without the express permission of the Land Commission. Modifica-
tions to the Act, after the electoral defeat of the socialists by the
conservative Social Credit Party, reduced the Land Commission's power
and increased that of the Cabinet.57
Ontario's agricultural land preservation policy is decentralized and
non-coercive, more like that in the United States. An executive policy
statement in 1978 indicated that the Provincial Cabinet would impose
some restrictions on a local government's development plans if it en-
croached unduly on farmland. Intellectual urban interest groups exerted
interest,5" and various discrete interventions in regional government af-
fairs occurred, but not on a systematic or all-encompassing basis.59
These "Policy Guidelines" were not followed by major government legis-
lation until 1983, when the Planning Act was amended to require that
the government protect "the natural environment, including the agricul-
tural resource base of the Province. '
Quebec's socialist, separatist Parti Qudbdcois government, elected in
1976, envisioned agricultural self-sufficiency in defiance of comparative
52 Quebec: see, eg., Department of Agriculture, Document de Consultation sur la Protection du
Territoire Agricole Qudbdcois, 1978 [hereinafter Protection du Territoire.Agricole]; Ontario: see Rodd,
The Crisis of Agricultural Land in the Ontario Countryside, 16 Plan Canada 160 (1976).
53 Eg. New Democratic Party.
54 Environment and Land Use Act, B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 110 (1979).
55 Order in Council 157, 46 B.C. Gaz. (part II) (Feb. 8, 1973). The definition of "farm land"
includes:
any land of 2 acres or more that is... designated as Class 1, 2, 3, or 4 of the classification
of soil capability for agriculture developed as part of the Canada Land Inventory under the
Agricultural and Rural Development Act (ARDA) (Canada).
Id. at 47.
56 Agricultural Land Commission Act, B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 9 (1979).
57 See, eg., id. § 13 (as amended).
58 It is interesting to note that much of the legislative thrust in Ontario for the protection of
agricultural land has come from "Private Members' bills," rather than from government-sponsored
legislation, contrary to the norm in a Parliamentary context. One such bill, The Non-resident Agri-
cultural Land Interest Registration Act, ONT. STAT. ch. 26 (1980), passed. Others, including the
Foodlands Protection Act [P.M. Bill 112, 31st Legisl., 2d Sess.] did not.
59 See Glenn, Approaches to the Protection of Agricultural Land in Quebec and Ontario: High-
ways and Byways, 11 CAN. PuB. PoL'Y 665 (1985).
60 An Act to Revise the Planning Act, ONT. STAT. ch. 1, § 2(a) (1983).
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advantage principles. This plan never materialized; even in Colonial
days, Quebec's inhabitants defied governmental orders and specialized in
the fur trade instead of cultivating the province's rocky soil.61 Of the
province's 135 million square kilometers of land, more than about two
and one half percent has never been cultivated at any given time.
In December 1978, the Parti Qudbdcois government intervened to
protect its agricultural land in a direct, centralized manner that is with-
out parallel in North America. The Loi Sur la Protection du Territoire
Agricole62 authorized the government to establish "designated agricul-
tural regions," and it did so from 1978 to 1981, covering virtually all of
settled Quebec. Nearly every non-urban parcel of land was designated as
"Green" (agricultural) by government decree, subject to slight modifica-
tion after consultation with the municipalities concerned. "White" (non-
agricultural) zones were essentially the existing urban areas of each mu-
nicipality, along with the estimated area necessary to meet short-term
needs as defined by provincial government planners. 3
Within a Green zone, permission of the Commission de Protection
du Territoire Agricole4 (CPTAQ) is necessary to use a lot for any non-
agricultural new purpose, except that an owner of vacant land at the time
of the agricultural zoning has the right to build one residence thereon.
No sugar maple trees may be cut down, no topsoil removed, and no sub-
division undertaken without CPTAQ approval. This permission is rarely
granted. 65 However, the Cabinet has the power to decide upon an indi-
vidual application in place of the CPTAQ. If the bureaucratic process
belies a methodologically flawed belief in pseudo-scientific planning,66
61 See, eg., M. TRUDEL, HIsToIRE DE LA NOUVELLE FRANCE (1966); V. FoWvKE, CANADIAN
AGRICULTURAL POLICY: THE HISTORICAL PATTERN, ch. 11 (1947).
62 L.R.Q., c. P-41 (Act for the protection of agricultural territory) [hereinafter LPTA].
63 Within a White area, municipal bylaws remain fully applicable. These bylaws include zon-
ing bylaws, which may well restrict urban land to quasi-rural uses.
64 Agricultural Territory Protection Commission.
65 When requests are made to use land for non-agricultural purposes, the act requires the
CPTAQ to base its decision upon only the following criteria:
The biophysical conditions of the soil and of the environment, the possible uses of the lot
for agricultural purposes and the economic consequences thereof, and the repercussions
that the granting of the application would have on the preservation of agricultural land in
the municipality and the region, and on the homogeneity of the farming community and
farming operations.
[§ 12, translation by author].
Legislation adopted in April 1989 modified the basic structure of the law, essentially establish-
ing a 100 acre zoning rule in rural areas, making the minimum lot size one hundred acres. Loi
modifiant la Loi sur la Protection du Territoire Agricole, L.Q. 1989, ch. 7, § 15 [hereinafter
LMLPTA].
66 See Delogu, A Comprehensive State and Local Strategy to Preserve the Nation's Farmland is
Unnecessary and Unwise, 34 U. KANSAS L. REv. 519 (1986).
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the potential political usurpation of this bureaucratic power' exposes the
whole plan as a transfer of valuable property rights from individuals to
the government. Such practice becomes evident considering that the area
zoned "Green" is over twice as large as the maximum area ever farmed
in the history of the province.68 Unlike many American farmland preser-
vation policies, the Agricultural Zoning Act explicitly rejects any com-
pensation for the many citizens whose land has been rendered
significantly less valuable by the legislation.
The effects of the Agricultural Zoning Act have been rather
predictable:
(1) Since fewer buyers are interested in Green zones, prices of such
land have dropped. The reduction has been calculated at up to thirty five
percent in certain counties with attractive alternate uses, and much
greater for individual lots within these counties.69 This price reduction
benefits younger farmers, who can expand their farms more cheaply, and
hurts older ones whose land, with its alternative uses, often serves as a
"pension plan." Younger farmers dominate the farmers' union70 and
tend to support the Parti Qudbdcois, while older farmers traditionally
vote Liberal. Age displacement at "fire sale" prices can be expected, as
can bargain sales of prominent homes by fleeing Anglophones to
Francophone Parti QueBdcois supporters. The percentage of younger
farmers (under thirty-six years old) in Quebec increased forty percent be-
tween 1971 and 1981, reversing earlier trends and supporting this
analysis.71
(2) Prices for existing expensive city, suburban, country and week-
end homes and land has increased, since Green zone land is no longer in
competition with it. 72 Parti Qu6bdcois leaders and cadres are, much more
likely to own such homes than is the average citizen.
67 LMPTA, supra note 65, ch. 7, § 46, 66 & 96. The government has not hesitated to use this
power, as when it granted a special exception to Texas' Bell Helicopters just before a provincial
election allowing it to build a giant manufacturing plant on prime farmland in Mirabel, QC.
68 Seven million hectares (17.5 million acres) are zoned Green. Acreage actually used for agri-
cultural purposes in Quebec peaked at about 3.5 million hectares in 1951. By 1986, only 2.1 million
hectares were being farmed (about thirty percent of the Green zone). See Canada Farm Credit
Corporation, "Trends in Farmland Value," Economic Report #21, Dec. 1987.
69 See, e.g., Vaillancourt & Monty, The Effect of Agricultural Zoning on Land Prices, Quebec
1975-1981, 61 LAND ECON. 36 (1985).
70 All farmers in Quebec must join the Union des Producteurs Agricoles (UPA) in order to
qualify for tax breaks and other benefits (some to be discussed infra) bestowed by the government on
farmers. The UPA, unlike farmers' associations in British Columbia, came out in support of the
Agricultural Zoning Act, and has supported the Parti Qudbicois at each election.
71 Canada Census, Agriculture, Quebec, 1971, 1981.
72 More accurately, the cost of competition is now higher due to, for example, claims to the
CPTAQ and costs of lobbying Cabinet and bureaucrats. Many White zone lots contiguous to Green
zone lots more than doubled in value in the first two years of the Act's existence. See THIBODEAY,
GAUDREAU, & BERGERON, Le Zonage Agricole: Un Bilan Positif, Quebec 1986, at 112.
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(3) If enough resources can be marshalled to pay for it, dezoning
at the political level is easily accomplished.7 3 Speculation and imperma-
nence 74 are not eliminated, which increases citizens' perception that the
ultimate allocation of goods is determined more by access to politicians
than by properly enforced and applied property right laws.
(4) Agriculture is largely a part-time business in Quebec, because
of the province's poor soils and severe climate. By precluding urban ex-
pansion in outlying areas, the law has actually hindered urban develop-
ment in the hinterland and has contributed to emptying outlying areas. 75
Emptying these farms also results in the elimination of rural competition
for small-city builders and maintenance people.76
(5) Transaction costs for all purchases of land or buildings in rural
areas have increased significantly, as the historic legality of all non-agri-
cultural use must be painstakingly researched through the chain of title.
As time passes, these costs are likely to increase.
(6) Finally, there is some question as to whether the Act has pre-
served agriculture in Quebec. Total improved farm acreage in the prov-
ince has dropped by twelve percent since its adoption, compared with a
drop of only five percent in relatively unregulated Ontario. Capital in-
vestment per hectare remains far lower than in Quebec's sister prov-
ince.7 7 Quality of farmland and extent of economic growth 78 are more
important determinants of agricultural activity than government plan-
ners suspected.
Agricultural zoning is not the only rural land protection scheme in
Quebec. 79 Quebec80 is not the only province to impose a hefty thirty-
three percent tax on agricultural and non-agricultural land transfers' to
non-residents in Canada. If the land is in a Green zone, the transfer
cannot even be registered without prior CPTAQ authorization unless the
Cabinet overrules the Commission," even if the foreign owner maintains
73 See Descotcaux, "Qu6bec a accepte plus de 45% des demandes de dezonage agricole"
("Quebec Cabinet accepts over 45% of rezoning requests") [compared with less than 5% at the
CPTAQ], Le Devoir [Montreal], Sept. 7, 1988, 1, 10.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
75 See Vachon, L'avenir de la Campagne quibicoise dans le contexte du nouveau Droit de
L'amenagement 28 CAHIERS DE GtOGRAPHIE DU QUtBEC 223 (1984)(The Future of Rural Quebec
in Light of Recent Zoning Legislation).
76 See THIBODEAU, supra note 72, at 80.
77 Canadian Census, Agriculture, 1981, 1986.
78 Economic growth has been stagnant in Quebec precisely because of collectivizing legislation
like the Agricultural Protection Act.
79 Quebec and the federal government offer provincial farmers long-term credit at below-mar-
ket rates. However, complex direct subsidy laws are not the prime focus of this article.
80 Eg., Land Transfer Tax Act, ONT. STAT. ch. 20, § 2 (1983).
81 Land Transfer Duties Act, QUE. REV. STAT ch. D-17 (1977).
82 Loi sur l'acquisition de Terrains par des Non-residents, L.R.Q., ch. A-4. 1.
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the agricultural use. The government claims that this is a rural land pro-
tection measure since foreign owners are "more likely to be land specula-
tors." 3 This type of legislation has been ruled constitutional, but its fate
under the Free Trade Agreement seems precarious.8 4 Paradoxically,
however, if the province modifies the act to regulate purchases by all out-
of-province residents, whether Canadian residents or foreigners, it will
withstand both constitutional and FTA attack. 5 Such blocks to mobility
have clear Public Choice implications 6. They would, however, be un-
constitutional if adopted by an American state.
Several provinces, but not yet Quebec, have limited the total number
of acres of agricultural 7 land that any individual resident or non-resi-
dent can own.8 The "family farm" is not perceived as being in danger in
Quebec, where only thirteen percent of the (principally dairy) farms are
larger than 400 acres. As concentration increases, 9 partially due to the
Zoning Act, it is expected that this further hindrance to agricultural effi-
ciency will be adopted in Quebec.
Similar to New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatche-
wan, Quebec has a "land bank" program, whereby the Minister of Agri-
culture may purchase land on the open market, and lease (but not sell) it
to farmers at agricultural rates. However, only leases to small family
farms may be made, and no assemblage of parcels into large farms by the
province is allowed. 0 Thus, this negates the only possible efficiency ar-
gument for the land bank.91
Quebec recently adopted 92 right-to-farm legislation, 9 voiding mu-
83 Protection du Territoire Agricole, supra note 52, at 18-19.
84 CATO INsT. supra, note 49.
85 Morgan v. Attorney Gen. of P.E.I., 2 S.C.R. 349 (1976), validating a law of Prince Edward
Island prohibiting non-islanders from buying more than ten acres of land, or five "chains" bordering
the sea, without the permission of the provincial Cabinet. Saskatchewan and Manitoba have similar
legislation. Manitoba's law covers only non-residents of Canada, Saskatchewan's law covers non-
residents of Saskatchewan. Alberta allows foreigners to buy up to twenty acres of rural land before
seeking Cabinet approval. See Saskatchewan Farm Ownership Act, SASK. STAT. ch. S-17, § 7
(1978); Agricultural and Recreational Land Ownership Act, ALTA. REv. STAT. ch. A-9, § 3 (1980);
Agricultural Lands Protection Act, C.C.S.M., c. A-17. The non-discrimination clauses of the Free
Trade Agreement do not invalidate the more restrictive legislation, since it treats Americans and
Canadians, outside their province, equally.
86 Out-of-province people may have been less influenced by provincial government
propaganda.
87 Saskatchewan (ten acres), Manitoba (ten acres), Prince Edward Island (ten acres, or five
chains of land bordering the sea). See supra; also the Prince Edward Island Lands Protection.
88 Prince Edward Island (1000 acres).
89 The thirteen percent figure quoted, as of 1986, is double the corresponding 1971 figure. See
Canada Census, Agriculture, Quebec, 1971, 1986.
90 Regulation Respecting the Arable Land Bank, QUE. REV. REGS. ch. M-14, div. 4 (1981).
91 Transaction costs might, in some limited cases, prevent private assemblages, although this
seems highly doubtful. See SIEGAN, supra note 10.
92 LMLPTA, supra note 65 ch. 7, § 26.
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nicipal nuisance bylaws and the basic civil law as applied to farms in the
Green zone. Consequently, adjacent White zone, non-rural, land users
no longer have recourse against a polluting farmer-neighbor. The new
system makes an efficient Coasian buy-out 94 prohibitively expensive,
since any purchased Green land may not be used for non-agricultural
purposes.
In a PAP variation, 95 farmers defined as such96 are reimbursed forty
percent of their property taxes by the province if their farm is located in a
White zone, and seventy percent if located in a Green zone, regardless of
level of income or wealth. Furthermore, taxes on farms located in a
Green zone may not exceed two percent of the farm's taxable value,
which itself may not exceed $152.00 per acre if the farm is in a Green
zone. Therefore, total taxes on a farm in a Green zone may not exceed
three dollars per acre per year, and seventy percent of this small sum is
refunded by the province.97 However, if the property is ceded to a person
for subdivision purposes (which must have been authorized by CPTAQ)
or for "speculation," the tax advantages no longer exist. Additionally,
the value of the past five years' worth of these tax advantages must be
paid to the province by the purchaser. If a farm is excluded from the
Green zone by the CPTAQ, then ten years' worth of back tax payments
become immediately due.98 Such prohibitive penalties are powerful dis-
incentives to convert often valueless agricultural land to more valuable
uses.
Quebec's system of agricultural quotas is very similar to those in
other provinces. 99 If ten producers propose collective sales through a
marketing board, a vote is taken by all provincial producers of the prod-
uct. If a majority concurs, then much like a closed-shop union, the plan
becomes compulsory for all. lO Seventeen such plans exist today. Those
respecting milk, eggs, and turkey include severe quotas. Prices for such
93 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
94 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (if the law transfers the right
from the urbanite to the farmer, the urbanite can always buy the farmer's land, or at least an ease-
ment thereon).
95 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21.
96 The candidate must be a dues-paying member of the official farmers' union. See supra text
accompanying notes 1-21. The primary requirement for membership is that a farmer produce at
least $3000.00 worth of goods for sale per year. Loi sur les Producteurs Agricoles, L.R.Q., c. P-28,
art. 1(g).
97 LoisurlaFiscaliteMunicipale, L.R.Q., ch. F-2.1, § 214-20. The province reimburses munic-
ipalities for the lost revenue.
98 Id., §§ 216, 219, 220, 220.1.
99 Federal marketing plans exist for several products in interprovincial trade. See Farm Prod-
ucts Marketing Agencies Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-4 (1985). In all fields though, the federal
government has delegated its power to create and enforce agricultural cartels to the provinces.
100 Farm Products Marketing Act, QuE. REv. STAT. ch. M-35 (1977).
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products are quite high in Quebec," ° ' and production is correspondingly
reduced in the classic monopoly model. No new production of eggs or
milk (the most likely agricultural activities considering Quebec's poor
soil) is allowed without the purchase of a quota, thus defeating one of the
prime purposes of the Agricultural Protection Act. In 1980, an egg
quota brought $CDN 114,000.00 and a milk quota brought $CDN
166,000.00102 Both prices have surely increased since then.
As is the case for every quota system, benefits have been captured by
the first generation of producers. Their successors in title, whose cost of
entry discounts the future income stream created by the quota system, do
not benefit. Once they have bought quotas, title successors are ardent
defenders of the quota system for obvious reasons.103 This is contradic-
tory, given the government's stated desire to increase agricultural advan-
tage, as land will remain unused or underused. The program also makes
start-up costs for a young farmer quite high, even if he has been able to
buy low-cost land from a quasi-expropriated older farmer.
CONCLUSION
Virtually none of the Canadian programs examined, and very few of
their American counterparts, are coherent efforts to protect truly valua-
ble farmland. Yet the farmland protection movement in Canada enjoys a
degree of popular support that is hard to explain. Julian Simon is surely
correct"°4 in saying that the emotional appeal of the agricultural preser-
vation issue is the product of half-truths and buzz words that politicians
unaware of real policy implications, are reluctant to challenge.10 5 Rural
land preservation legislation, especially in a massively underveloped
country like Canada, is a bad idea. It is time to expose its fallacies, and
to eliminate such needless legislation.
101 A gallon of milk costs about $CDN3.75, or $US2.90; a dozen large eggs typically sell for
about $US1.50.
102 See Green, Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada: An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 33
U. TORONTO L.J. 407, 416 (1983).
103 See Bertin, Subsidies for Farmers May be an Intractable Dilemna, The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Jan. 12, 1987, at BIl, col. I (nat'l ed.).
104 Simon, Some False Notions About Farmland Preservation, in THE VANISHING FARMLAND
CRISIS 59 (J. Baden ed. 1984).
105 For liberal usage of these buzzwords in relation to recent efforts to modify Quebec legisla-
tion, see, Lesage, "Le dezonage de bonnes terres: Page est ebranle par les hauts cris des organisms
agricoles" ("The De-zoning of good land: Mr. Page is shaken by the cries of agricultural organiza-
tions"), Le Devoir March 25, 1987, 2; Lesage, Le tapage autour du dizonage agricole: "Ddmagogiel"
sdcrient les MRC (The Trouble Surrounding Argricultural De-zoning: "Demagogueryl" Cry the
Regional Municipalities), Le Devoir July 15, 1988, at I, col. 1.
1991]

